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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
; #2A-6/16/83 
In the Matter of 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
CORNING, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASFT NO~.:^ 0-6T72" 
CORNING TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT. AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2589, 
Charging Party. 
HOGAN & SARZYNSKI, ESQ., for Respondent 
PAUL S. MAYO, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City 
School District of the City of Corning (District) to a 
hearing officer's decision that it violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor Law by unilaterally changing the insurance carrier 
and claim administrator of its medical and dental insurance 
plan. 
The 1979-82 collective bargaining agreement between the 
District and Corning Teachers Association. NYSUT. AFT, 
AFL-CIO. Local 2589 (Local 2589) provided that the medical 
and dental plans would meet certain "Blue Cross/Blue Shield" 
8323 
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benefit specifications.— but it did not name an insurance 
carrier or administrator. Until July 1. 1982. the District 
purchased the insurance from Blue Cross/Blue Shield, but on 
May 13. 1982. it notified Blue Cross/Blue Shield that the 
group- insurance—policies would-be cancelled effective-Juiy 1. 
1982. the day after the collective bargaining agreement was 
to expire. In its place the District set up a self-insurance 
program which is administered by Health Care Administrative 
Services of New York. Inc. (HASNY). The District also 
insured itself against catastophic loss in the event of 
excessive claims. 
Although the District was in negotiation with Local 2589 
for a successor agreement when it cancelled the Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield coverage, it did not notify the Local about 
the change. The Local discovered the change in early June 
when,new insurance forms were circulated among the unit 
employees. It then filed the charge herein. 
1/The agreement provided that the "health insurance plan 
will meet the specifications of the Blue Cross 360-Day plan and 
the Blue Shield UCRI plan with the following riders . . . ." 
It further provided that "the District will provide a dental 
plan that will meet the specifications of the Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield Option II . . . ." 
i- 8323 
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The hearing officer found that the conversion rights 
under the new plan were not as attractive as under the old 
plan and that the reimbursement rate for one dental procedure 
had been diminished. He also found unit employees were 
disadvantaged by changes in the administrative procedures 
involved in the filing of claims and receipt of payments. He 
concluded that the District had violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law by changing to a self-funded plan under a new 
administrator unilaterally and he ordered the District to 
reinstate the Blue Cross/Blue Shield program. 
The primary thrust of the exceptions is that the hearing 
officer rejected the District's argument that the improper 
practice charge merely alleges a violation of a collective 
bargaining agreement and is therefore not within this Board's 
jurisdiction. Whether or not the change was in conformity 
with the agreement is, according to the District, subject 
only to the arbitration procedures provided by that 
agreement. The basis of this argument is that an agreement 
was in effect on May 13. 1982, when the District cancelled 
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield policy. Moreover, the District 
asserts a contractual right to make the change in that the 
contract did not require a Blue Cross/Blue Shield policy, but 
merely called for insurance coverage that would meet Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield benefit specifications. 
j. -
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In rejecting this argument, the hearing officer 
determined that, although Blue Cross/Blue Shield was notified 
on May 13. 1982 that the insurance policies would be 
cancelled, the act of cancellation took effect on July 1, 
1982,— aft er—the expiration of^ -t-fae—collective-bar gaining 
agreement. Accordingly, he reasoned, no agreement could have 
been violated by the cancellation; the only violation that 
could have occurred would be of the Taylor Law requirement 
that the District not change existing terms and conditions of 
employment while under a duty to negotiate a successor 
agreement. Accordingly, the hearing officer concluded that 
the alleged violation is subject to the jurisdiction of this 
2/ Board. We affirm the conclusion of the hearing officer.— 
The District further argues that, in any event, there 
was no substantial change because the benefit and other 
differences between the two health programs are de minimis. 
Conceding that the conversion features and one dental benefit 
of the former plan are superior to the comparable features of 
the new plan, it contends that the benefit and protection 
differences that flow from its administrative procedures are 
2/see Deer Park UFSD, 14 PERB 1P028 (1981). 
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as good as those that flow from the administrative procedures 
of Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Therefore, it asserts, if the 
Board has jurisdiction, we should order the District to 
provide conversion features and a dental benefit schedule 
comparable to those of the Blue Cross/Blue Shield policies. 
but not direct the reinstatement of those policies. 
Having reviewed the record, we determine that the 
benefit and protection differences between the two programs 
are significant and that the District's unilateral change in 
the kind and level of benefits enjoyed by the unit employees 
disadvantages unit employees. Moreover, not only changes in 
conversion rights and the dental benefit schedule but also 
the differences in the administrative practices of Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield and HASNY disadvantage them. For example. 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield has contracted with various 
physicians, dentists and hospitals who have agreed to accept 
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield compensation rates as full payment 
for services rendered. Lists of these were then compiled by 
Blue Cross/Blue Shield and distributed to covered employees. 
Although, with one exception, the current compensation 
rates are the same as those provided by Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield, no physicians, dentists and hospitals have obligated 
themselves to accept those rates in full payment of services 
rendered to HASNY covered employees. If the normal charge of 
>Ut&AJ 
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a physician, dentist or hospital is more than it has 
agreed to accept from Blue Cross/Blue Shield, a person 
covered by HASNY may have to make up the difference 
himself. Furthermore, even if some physicians and 
dentists accept the HASNY compensation rates in full 
payment for services rendered, HASNY-covered employees 
have no way of knowing in advance which do so. Without 
lists comparable to those distributed by Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield, HASNY-covered employees must make inquiries on 
their own at a time when illness may make it inconvenient 
for them to do so. 
Accordingly, the District failed to afford these 
employees the benefits that meet the specifications of 
the Blue Cross/Blue Shield program. We therefore 
determine that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Taylor Law. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District to: 
1. Provide health and dental insurance 
coverage to unit employees which 
meet the specifications of the 
insurance program in effect before 
July 1. 1982; and 
- S**97 
! 
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2. Sign and post a notice in the form 
attached at all locations normally used 
for communications to the unit employees 
DATED-:......June. 16 . -19-83 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
&-*> /&. J-****-
Ida Kiaus. Member 
David C. Randies, Meprber 
•<J>HJrfd 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
_ PUBLIC EMPLOYMENTLRELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Corning Teachers 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local 2589 that the City School District of 
the City of Corning will: 
1. provide health and dental insurance coverage to unit emmployees 
which meet the specifications of the insurance program in 
effect before July 1, 1982. 
City .School. .Distrip.t. .o.f .the. City .of .Corning. 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
N* 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS. 
Respondent, 
-and-
SARATOGA~SraT^S^TREFIGHTOR^»nLOCAL 
3 4 3 . IAFF. AFL-CIO. 
Charging Party. 
GRASSO AND GRASSO, ESQS.. for Charging Party 
JOSEPH T. KELLY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Saratoga Springs Firefighters. Local 343. IAFF. AFL-CIO 
(Local 343) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its 
charge that the City of Saratoga Springs (City) violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing to negotiate in 
good faith with respect to nine demands that it made during 
collective negotiations. The City acknowledged its refusal 
to negotiate the demands, but it argued that they did not 
constitute mandatory subjects of negotiation.— The 
hearing officer found merit in this defense. Local 343 also 
A/ln addition to the issues raised by Local 343's 
exceptions, the hearing officer found some other demands to 
be nonmandatory subjects of negotiation, and still others 
to be mandatory. There are no guestions regarding those 
parts of the hearing officer's decision before us. 
#2B-6/16/83 
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complains that the hearing officer improperly received a 
document in evidence. 
The first of the demands which, according to Local 343, 
the hearing officer erroneously determined to be nonmandatory 
concerns management responsibilities regarding equal 
opportunity.— The hearing officer determined that the 
demand was nonmandatory because it merely restates 
protections contained in the constitution and civil rights 
statutes. Local 343 responds that the proposed protections 
go beyond those dealing with ethnic and labor relations 
discrimination and include "political favoritism which the 
Civil Service Law was designed to prohibit." Nevertheless, 
the demand merely restates statutory rights and is, 
therefore, not a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
2/The demand states: "It is agreed by the City, the 
Department and the Union that the City is obligated. 
legally and morally, to provide equality of opportunity, 
consideration and treatment of all members of the 
Department and to establish policies and regulations that 
will insure such equality of opportunity, consideration, 
and treatment of all regularly appointed members employed 
by the Saratoga Springs Fire Department of the Department 
of Public Safety of the City of Saratoga Springs in all 
phases of the employment process, and to all benefits of 
the Civil Service Laws and rules and regulations of the 
State of New York." (emphasis supplied) 
smt 
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The second demand in question paraphrases the Taylor Law 
prohibition of improper employer practices and the hearing 
3 / 
officer found it nonmandatory for that reason.- Local 343 
argues that the demand goes beyond the law in that it 
requires the employer "to meet. . . . or confer on proper 
matters . . . upon proper and reasonable notice." It 
contends that the law merely requires the City to negotiate 
upon the expiration of a contract, while the demand requires 
discussions during the life of a contract. 
Local 343 misreads the duty to negotiate, which is 
specified in §204.3 of the Taylor Law. That duty includes an 
obligation to meet and confer with respect to questions 
arising under an agreement. We therefore affirm the decision 
of the hearing officer that this demand is nonmandatory. 
1/The demand states: "No official or agent of the 
City of Saratoga Springs shall: 
(1) Initiate, create, dominate, contribute to or 
interfere with the formation or administration of 
any employee organization meeting the requirements 
of law. 
(2) Discriminate in regard to employment or 
conditions of employment in order to encourage or 
discourage membership in a labor organization. 
(3) Discriminate against an employee because he 
has given testimony or taken part in any grievance 
procedures or other hearings, negotiations or 
conference as part of the labor organization 
recognized under the terms of this agreement; or 
(4) Refuse to meet, negotiate or confer on proper 
matters with representatives of the Union as set 
forth in this Agreement, upon proper and 
reasonable notice." (emphasis supplied) 
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The third demand at issue deals with polygraph 
tests. It provides that, with specified exceptions, 
unit employees shall not be subjected to polygraph 
tests "for any reason" in an "investigation by 
superior officers designated by the fire chief or the 
commissioner of public safety."— The hearing 
officer determined that the words "for any reason" 
took the demand beyond investigations of departmental 
misconduct, and he held that it was therefore not 
mandatory. 
Local 343 asserts in its exceptions that by its 
terms the demand deals with internal investigations 
relating to departmental misconduct. Moreover, it 
states that this is the sole purpose of the demand. 
As clarified by Local 343, the demand is a mandatory 
i-^ The demand states: "The wide ranging powers and 
duties given to the Department and its members involve them 
in all manner of contacts and relationships with the 
public. Out of these contacts may come questions 
concerning the actions of members of the Department. These 
questions often require immediate investigation by superior 
officers designated by the Fire Chief or the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. In an effort to ensure that these 
investigations are conducted in a manner which is conducive 
to good order and discipline, the following rules are 
hereby adopted:...No member shall be ordered or asked to 
submit to a Polygraph (lie detector) test for any reason as 
long as Polygraph tests are not admitted without consent of 
the person charged into evidence by Courts of Record in 
Civil or Criminal proceedings in this state. Such tests 
may be given if requested by the member." (emphasis 
supplied) 
Board - U-6451 
subject of negotiation.— 
The fourth demand before us provides that during 
an investigation, unit employees shall not "be 
subjected to any offensive language" or threatened 
6 / 
with dismissal.— Focusing on the language 
prohibiting the threat of dismissal, the hearing 
officer determined that this demand merely restates 
existing law. However, we note that the prohibition 
against subjecting unit employees to offensive 
language goes beyond the protection contained in any 
statute, and that the additional protection deal with 
terms and conditions of employment. Accordingly, we 
find this demand to be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
The fifth demand at issue would require the City 
to recall off-duty firefighters and to pay them, 
whether used or not, whenever it invokes the mutual 
I/see Buffalo PBA v. Helsby, no official report. 9 
PERB T7020 (Sup. Ct. Erie Co.. 1976); Troy Uniformed 
Firefighters. 10 PERB ir3015 (1977). 
£./The demand states, "The member of the Department 
shall not, during any interrogation, be subjected to any 
offensive language, nor shall he be threatened with 
dismissal or other disciplinary punishment. No promise of 
reward shall be made as an inducement to answering 
questions." (emphasis supplied) 
Board - U-6451 -6 
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aid program.— The hearing officer determined that 
the City cannot be compelled to recall firefighters. 
Local 343 argues that the demand is mandatory because 
the utilization of the mutual aid program must be seen 
as a variation of subcontracting and that the demand 
is therefore merely designed to provide overtime 
compensation to unit employees. We affirm the 
decision of the hearing officer. In Hudson Falls 
Permanent Firefighters. 14 PERB «|[3021 (1981). we held 
it to be a management prerogative to decide whether or 
not to call in off-duty firefighters during an 
emergency, and in Local 589. IAFF. 16 PERB 1P030 
(1983). we held that the invocation of mutual aid 
among firefighting companies of neighboring 
communities does not constitute subcontracting. 
The sixth demand presented to us provides "newly 
created and vacant positions shall be filled . . . 
immediately". The hearing officer ruled that it is a 
management prerogative to determine whether or not it 
needs to fill vacant positions. Local 343 argues that 
I/The demand states, "The employer recognizes its 
obligation to utilize the services of its own Fire Fighters 
even when outside assistance under the Mutual Aid Program 
may be necessary. The City will therefore develop a plan 
for the re-call of off-duty Fire Fighters simultaneously 
with any Mutual Aid Call, and the parties will do their 
utmost to see that such plan is made effective. Any 
employee who is recalled under such a plan shall be paid 
for his time whether or not his services are utilized." 
'8M 
) 
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the demand would not interfere with the management 
prerogative in that the City is always free to 
eliminate the vacant positions. In accordance with 
our decision in Hudson Falls Permanent Firefighters. 
14 PERB ir3021 (1981), we affirm the decision of the 
the hearing officer. 
The seventh demand before us would prohibit the 
City from using volunteers to replace firefighters who 
8/ 
are on temporary or permanent leave.— The hearing 
officer determined that this demand would interfere 
with the management prerogative of determining the 
nature and level of services to be provided. We 
agree. The demand would prevent the City from 
utilizing the services of volunteers in emergency 
situations. This would impose a restriction upon the 
services that the City may choose to render to its 
constituency and is. therefore, not a mandatory 
9/ 
subject of negotiation.— 
il/The demand states: "For the period covered by this 
agreement the City agrees that no permanent member of the 
Department who leaves the service may be replaced by a 
volunteer, nor will the City employ the services of 
volunteers to replace permanent employees who are on leave 
of absence, ill. or disabled even on a temporary basis." 
^The demand was presented as an inseparable unit. 
As one part of it is nonmandatory, we need not consider the 
rest of the demand. Pearl River UFSD. 11 PERB ir3085 
(1978): Town of Haverstraw. 11 PERB 1f3109 (1978). 
Board - U-6451 
-8 
The eighth demand presented to us by the exceptions 
deals with the reliability of equipment for safety purposes 
and provides for a procedure whereby complaints can be made 
to platoon commanders, who are unit employees, who "shall 
have effective authority to remedy the situation by 
withdrawal of the equipment from use . . . . " — T h e 
hearing officer found the demand to be nonmandatory because 
it would give unit employees veto power over equipment 
selected by the City. 
Local 343 argues that the responsibilities of the 
platoon commander are irrelevant in that the fire chief 
12/The demand states: 
The Safety Committee shall be free to inspect any 
equipment used in the fighting of fires or other work 
of the Department, and advise the Chief of any faulty 
equipment found. Any fire fighter or the Safety 
Committee may call to the attention of the platoon 
commander in charge the fact that certain equipment 
may be dangerous to use, and the Commander shall have 
effective authority to remedy the situation by 
withdrawal of the equipment from use or arranging for 
its immediate repair. If the platoon commander 
refuses to take the necessary steps to remedy the 
situation, he must notify the Safety Committee of his 
decision within twelve (12) hours after the matter is 
brought to his attention, in which event the matter 
shall be laid before the Fire Chief. If the Chief 
agrees with platoon commander, he must so advise the 
committee within two (2) working days and the Union 
may then present the dispute to the Commissioner of 
Public Safety. Rejection by the Commissioner will 
permit commencement of the arbitration procedure 
provided in Article VI of this agreement. 
Provided however, that nothing herein contained shall 
require an employee to endanger his life because of 
faulty equipment. (emphasis supplied) 
. 830? 
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"has the final say in decisions about the use of 
equipment." We find that the demand would take that 
responsibility away from the chief and give it to unit 
employees. Accordingly, it is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation.— 
The last demand at issue would relieve firefighters 
from the performance of various functions including snow 
12/ 
removal around the fire house.— In Fairview 
Professional Firefighters Association. 12 PERB 1f3083 
(1979), we determined that many of the job duties 
referred to in this demand, other than snow removal. 
were not the inherent work of firefighters and. 
therefore, their performance was a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. The hearing officer determined that snow 
removal, however, is an inherent job duty of 
firefighters in that it is necessary to assure that the 
fire equipment can be taken out on the street. 
In its response. Local 343 does not address this 
determination, but merely asserts that the job duties 
11/See City of Kingston. 9 PERB 1P069 (1976). 
12./The demand states: "Members shall not be required 
to do any painting, carpentry, plumbing, electrical, 
heating or mechanical work. Members shall not be required 
to do any work to the exterior of the fire department 
buildings nor shall they be required to maintain the 
grounds or remove snow from around said buildings." 
(emphasis supplied) 
\ 
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referred to in the demand are not the inherent work of 
firefighters. Were the demand limited to snow removal of 
walkways and other areas not affecting the ability to put 
equipment on the street, it might be a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. However, Local 343 does not so limit its 
demand and we therefore find that it goes to the ability of 
firefighters to fight fires, and is not a mandatory subject 
of negotiation.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE CONCLUDE that the City has violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by 
refusing to negotiate in good faith 
with respect to those items above, 
) determined to be mandatory subjects of 
negotiation, and we order it to 
negotiate those demands in good faith. 
UL/Apart from its objection to specific 
determinations of the hearing officer. Local 343 also 
complains that, in connection with this last demand, the 
hearing officer improperly had before him respondent's 
Exhibit 2, which is a duty statement of firefighters. The 
exhibit was attached to respondent's brief to the hearing 
officer. The duty statement, which relates to the last 
demand, was not relied upon by the hearing officer. In any 
event, the duty statement is irrelevant to our 
determination that the demand is nonmandatory. We 
therefore dismiss this exception. 
Board - U-6451 
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In all other respects, we order that 
the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: June 16. 1983 
Albany:, _New_York 
^jfiZutsJ? K M^^K S0*i/ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
£%rtA^ua 
Ida Klaus , Member 
David C. Randies , 
^ \j>\ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COBLESKILL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
-and-
COTLl:si^Lir^EACMRS_ASSO«ATION." 
Charging Party. 
W. LAWRENCE BELLCOURT, ESQ.. for Respondent 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD. ESQ. (JANET AXELROD, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was brought by the Cobleskill Teachers 
Association (Association). It alleges that it had an 
agreement with the Cobleskill Central School District 
(District) which expired on June 30. 1982. and which 
contained a salary schedule that related teachers' salaries 
to the number of years of service and to the extent of their 
academic achievement.— It further alleges that no 
successor agreement had been negotiated as of the opening of 
school in September 1982, and that the District, at that 
time, failed to pay salaries in accordance with the terms of 
the expired agreement. Noting that §209-a.l(e), which became 
1/Appendix A. attached to this decision, is the 
salary schedule contained in Article IV of the contract. 
//2C-6/16/83 
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effective on July 29, 1982. provides, in pertinent part, that 
"[i]t shall be an improper practice for a public employer or 
its agents deliberately . . . to refuse to continue all the 
terms of an expired agreement until a new agreement is 
negotiated . . .", the charge complained that the District 
improperly refused to continue the terms of the expired 
agreement. 
The hearing officer found a violation as charged, and 
the matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
2/ 
District.— While the exceptions refer to thirteen 
statements in the hearing officer's decision which the 
District deems to be in error, they raise three essential 
questions. These are: First, did the District refuse to 
continue the terms of the expired agreement when, in 
September 1982. it refused to pay salary increments based 
upon years of service? Second, does the newly enacted 
§209-a.l(e) require the District to pay salary increments 
based upon years of service? Third, did the hearing officer 
apply §209-a.l(e) retroactively in determining that the 
District's conduct was improper? We consider each of these 
questions in the order stated. 
^/Briefs amicus curiae in support of the exceptions 
were filed by the New York State School Boards Association 
and by attorneys representing various school districts. 
M2 
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By its terms, the agreement negotiated by the 
Association and the District provided a salary schedule of 
progressive salary advancement for increased years of 
teaching service. Under the agreement, as the teachers 
accrued an additional year of service, they received a 
service increment which moved them to a higher salary level. 
Thus, for example, a teacher reaching his seventh year of 
employment received a 414-dollar increase over what he was 
paid in his sixth year. When school opened in September 
1982, however, the District did not apply the salary schedule 
in accordance with its terms and teachers were not moved up 
the salary schedule by reason of their added service. Thus, 
a teacher in his seventh year of employment did not receive 
the 414 dollars but was paid as if he were still in his sixth 
year of employment. 
The District argues that the salary schedule was merely 
designed to provide a basis for calculating salary levels 
applicable during the term of the agreement and was not 
intended to survive the agreement. It bases this argument 
upon evidence of a past practice in the District of not 
always paying seniority-related increments after the 
expiration of past contracts. 
This argument of the District is misplaced. The issue 
before us is not whether there was a past practice of paying 
increments that survives the expiration of the parties' 
„. 8343 
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agreement as part of the status quo to be maintained until a 
successor agreement is negotiated. Here we are dealing with 
the express terms of an expired agreement, all the terms of 
which the District is required to continue until a successor 
agreement is negotiated. That agreement specifies the 
payment of salary to unit employees based upon their years of 
teaching service. It does not contain any language 
indicating that the parties intended the salary schedule to 
be treated differently from other provisions of the agreement 
after its expiration. It is thus clear that when, upon the 
opening of school in September 1982, the District did not pay 
the progressive salaries for additional service specified in 
the agreement, it failed to continue those particular terms 
of the agreement. 
The second argument raised by the District's exceptions 
is that §209-a.l(e) does not require it to pay salary 
increments based upon years of service. The District relies 
upon Rockland County BOCES v. PERB. 41 NY2d 753 (1977). 10 
PERB T7010. in which the Court of Appeals ruled that, for 
policy reasons, after the expiration of an agreement, a 
public employer's obligation to maintain the status quo 
during negotiations for a successor agreement does not 
include a duty to pay increments that would have been 
required under the expired agreement. The plain answer to 
this argument is that the language of the new statute, which 
requires "all terms" of the expired contract to be continued. 
Board - U-6374 -5 
has made Rockland County BOCES inapplicable to increments 
specified in an expired contract. 
That this is the effect of the new statute is clearly 
indicated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in 
Maplewood-Colonie Common School District v. Maplewood 
Teachers Association. 57 NY2d 1025 (1982), 15 PERB T7538. 
decided after the new statute became law. In holding that a 
public employer must pay seniority-based increments pursuant 
to the terms of an expired agreement, the Court of Appeals 
reversed a decision of the Third Department (85 AD2d 764 
[1981]. 15 PERB T7516). rendered before passage of the new 
statute, which held that the public policy expressed in 
Rockland County BOCES precluded the application of the 
continuation of benefits clause to salary increments. 
Rejecting this holding, the Court of Appeals found that the 
new statute declared a contrary public policy. Thus, the 
Court of Appeals decided that the legislature had changed the 
prior public policy declared in Rockland County BOCES as to 
the duty to continue to pay service-related increments after 
the expiration of an agreement. The reasoning of the Court's 
opinion makes manifest that the new statute reversed the 
prior public policy regardless of whether or not the expired 
agreement contained a continuation of benefits clause. 
Having found that the District refused to continue the 
terms of an expired agreement, we now reach the question 
whether the hearing officer's determination that the refusal 
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was improper constituted a retroactive application of the new 
statute. The question arises because of the time sequence of 
the events in this case. The agreement that contained the 
salary schedule expired on June 30, 1982. The District's 
refusal to abide by the salary schedule occurred in September 
1982. Section 209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law took effect 
during the interim between these two events, on July 29. 1982. 
Agreeing with the hearing officer, we determine that the 
statute covered the conduct of the District. To understand 
the nature of the District's obligation under the new 
statute, it is necessary to look closely at the language of 
the new improper practice. It expresses for the first time a 
statutory policy governing a public employer's conduct during 
the interim, or hiatus period, between collective bargaining 
agreements. The statute does not extend the life of the 
expired agreement; it declares that the obligation created by 
that agreement must, however, continue to apply during that 
interim. Thus, any obligation of the employer that would 
have become operative at a particular time during the life of 
the expired agreement must now apply upon the advent of such 
particular time during the hiatus period. For purposes of 
determining whether a violation occurred, the time when the 
agreement expired is therefore not significant. What is 
significant is the particular time when the public employer 
refused to continue its terms. 
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In the instant case, the refusal took place in September 
1982. after the effective date of the statute. At that 
particular time the District would have been obligated under 
the salary schedule of the expired agreement to increase the 
salaries of its teachers for accrued service. The statute 
effectively imposed that obligation upon the District 
prospectively after the expiration of the agreement and 
before the negotiation of a successor. 
Accordingly, the hearing officer's determination that 
the District violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law did not 
involve a retroactive application of the statute and we 
affirm his finding. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the District: 
1. to cease and desist from refusing to pay 
unit employees in accordance with the 
salary schedule contained in an expired 
agreement until a successor agreement is 
3/ 
negotiated;— and 
3/No affirmative relief is required. The parties 
have reached an agreement since the hearing officer's 
decision was issued. The retroactive salary payments 
required by that agreement will compensate the unit 
employees for loss suffered by reason of the violation 
found. 
•O" 
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2. to sign and post a notice in the form 
attached at all places ordinarily used 
for communications to unit employees. 
DATED: June_16,_ 1983 
Albany, New York 
gT^U- /O^fac*^^-
Ida Klaus. Member 
APPENDIX A 
•' ARTICLE IV 
SALARIES AND PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION 
A. The fo l low ing schedule sha l l be in e f f e c t f o r the 1981-82 school year. 
Level 
1 
2 
3 
A -
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
19a 
B 
11 
11 
11 
— 1 2 -
12 
13 
13 
.13 
,052 
,467 
,881 
£-98-— 
,713 
,130 
,544 
,960 
14,400 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
16 
17 
17 
,842 
,244 
,649 
,063 
,479 
,933 
,978 
18,444 
19 
19 
,148 
,854. 
B + 30 
11,652 
12 
12 
-12-
13 
13 
14 
14 
15 
15 
15 
16 
16 
17 
17 
17 
18 
19 
19 
20 
,067 
,481 
r898- -
,313 
,730 
,144 
,560 
,000 
,442 
,844 
,249 
,663 
,079 
,533 
,950 
,578 
,044 
,748 
,454 
M 
11 
12 
12 
- 13 
13 
14 
14 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
16 
17 
17 
18 
18 
19 
20 
20 
,977 
,392 
,806 
r223 
,638 
,055 
,469 
,885 
,325 
,767 
,169 
,574 
,988 
,404 
,858 
?«5 
,903 
,369 
,073 
,779 
B + 60 
12,402 
12 
13 
13-
14 
14 
14 
15 
15 
16 
15 
16 
17 
17 
18 
18 
19 
19 
20 
21 
,817 
,231 
,-648--
,063 
,480 
,894 
,310 
,750 
,192 
,594 
,999 
,413 
,829 
,283 
,710 
,328 
,794 
,498 
,204 
M ^  
12 
13 
13 
13-
14 
14 
15 
15 
16 
16 
16 
17 
17 
18 
18 
19 
19 
20 
20 
21 
^ 30 
,727 
,142 
,556 
Q7^ 
,-y-/-o— 
,388 
,805 
,219 
,635 
,075 
,517 
,919 
,324 
,738 
,154 
,608 
,035 
,653 
,119 
,823 
,529 
Teachers completing one year o f serv ice a t Levels 1-13 and 15-18 o f 
the 1980-81 salary schedule sha l l advance one level to the 1981-82 
sa lary schedule. Conditions pursuant to Level 15 f o l l ow : 
Level 15 - Advancement to Level 15 requires tha t a teacher must: 
a. have been on Level 14 f o r a t leas t one year . 
b. have completed s i x (6) hours o f approved study w i t h i n 
the past ten (10) years. 
Level 19 - Teachers having completed one year of service at Level 19 
w i l l advance to Level 19a. 
„., O<LI4<J 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Cobleskill Teachers 
Association that the Cobleskill Central School District: 
Will not refuse to pay unit employees in accordance 
with the salary schedule contained in an expired 
agreement until a successor agreement is negotiated. 
Cobleskill Central School District 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-6/16/83 
In the Matter of 
MANCHESTER-SHORTSVILLE CENTRAL CASE NO. E-0891 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential 
STANTON & VANDER BYL, ESQS. (WAYNE A. VANDER BYL, 
ESQ.. of Counsel), for Manchester-Shortsville 
Central School District 
HINMAN. STRAUB. PIGORS & MANNING. P.C. (BARTLEY J. 
COSTELLO. III. ESQ.. of Counsel), for the Red 
Jacket Administrators' Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of James 
Boyle and Dominic Carra to a determination of the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) that they are managerial employees. Boyle and 
Carra are principals of the District's only secondary and 
only elementary school respectively. Together they 
constitute the administrators' unit and together with the 
superintendent they constitute the District's only 
educational administrators. 
Before October 1981. when the Red Jacket 
Administrators' Association vras recognized as the 
representative of Boyle and Carra. they regularly attended 
executive sessions of the Board of Education. The record 
8351 
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shows that personnel matters were considered at these 
sessions, particularly teacher discipline. While they have 
not attended executive sessions of the Board of Education 
since the Administrators' Association was recognized as their 
representative, the Director determined that they may 
reasonably -ber required'~tb~do~soY This .^accordlng^tcr the ^ 
Director, is a sufficient basis for granting the District's 
application. The Director found further support for his 
decision in the fact that both Boyle and Carra have acted on 
behalf of the superintendent during brief periods when he 
attended to business outside the District and Boyle did so 
for an extended period when the superintendent was ill. 
In support of its exceptions. Boyle and Carra argue that 
they are no more than high level supervisors such as the 
principals who were determined not to be managerial employees 
in Hempstead. 6 PERB 1P001 (1973). aff'd 42 AD2d 1056 (3rd 
Dept.). 6 PERB T7012 (1973), aff'd 35 NY 877, 7 PERB T7024 
(1974). We find, however, that Hempstead is not applicable 
because, unlike the principals there. Boyle and Carra had 
functioned as managerial employees in the past, and they are 
the sole educational administrators other than the 
Superintendent. The Director's conclusion that they may 
reasonably be required to perform managerial functions is 
therefore particularly persuasive. Accordingly, we affirm 
his determination that they meet the criteria for 
Board - E-0891 
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designation as managerial set forth in §201.7(a) of the 
Taylor Law.— 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the application of the 
District to designate James Boyle and 
Dominic Carra as managerial employees 
be. and it hereby is, granted 
DATED: June 16. 1983 
Albany, New York 
- ^ f e i ^ ^ /ft A/&^-«oa^<_ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
JiL= &&«*. I^p* 
Ida K l a u s . Member 
1 /See C i t y of Newburqh. 16 PERB ir3053 (1983) 
v X y l 
• " ) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ALBANY. 
Employer. 
ALBANY COUNTY PROBATION EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Albany County Probation 
Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Probation Assistant. Probation 
Officer Trainee. Probation Officer. 
Senior Probation Officer and 
Probation Supervisor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Albany County Probation 
Employees Assocition and enter into a written agreement with such 
employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment of the employees inTthlTlahitfblahd^ p^^ ropriate^ r""ancT-" 
shall negotiate collectively with such employee organization in 
the determination of, and administration of. grievances of such 
employees. 
DATED: June 16. 1983 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
7<&< 
David C. Randies. Member 
V>v* 
